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BULGARIA

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON TWO NEW GOVERNMENT MEMBERS

Sofia STROITEL in Bulgarian 18 May 77 p 1

[Biographical data]

[Text] Ivan Sakarev, minister of construction and construction materials

Comrade Ivan Sakarev was born on 3 December 1933 in Dobrinishte Village, Blagoevgrad Okrug, in a peasant family. He completed his secondary education in 1951 in Razlog, and his higher education--construction engineering--in 1957, at the VISI [Higher Construction Engineering Institute].

Between 1957 and 1961 he was employed at the construction organization in Blagoevgrad, consecutively as an engineer, chief of production department, and chief engineer.

In 1961 he won the competition for assistant professor at the Higher Engineering Construction Institute in Sofia.

Between 1964 and 1968 he completed post-graduate studies in Kiev as a correspondence student and defended a dissertation on problems of assembly-line housing construction methods.

He was awarded the title of Candidate of Technical Sciences. In 1968 he was appointed VISI docent. From 1966 to 1969 he also headed the building of systems for construction management at the Institute for Construction Cybernetics. Over a period of many years he worked as a director of the Scientific Research Institute for Roads. He also worked at the Industrial-Economic Department of the BCP Central Committee as associate in the use of economic-mathematical methods in construction.

Within that period, along with his production activities, he participated in the writing of and wrote by himself text books and training aids. He is the author of over 20 works in the field of construction organization.

Between 1974 and 1976 he was secretary in charge of construction of the Blagoevgrad Okrug BCP Committee.

Elected BCP Central Committee candidate member at the 11th BCP Congress.

Promoted first secretary of the Blagoevgrad Okrug BCP Committee in 1976.



Stefan Staynov, chairman of the Committee for Architecture and Public Works of the Council of Ministers


Architect Stefan Staynov was appointed chairman of the Committee for Architecture and Public Works of the Council of Ministers.

Comrade Stefan Staynov was born on 25 January 1935 in Sofia. He graduated from the Higher Engineering-Construction Institute in 1958 in architecture.

He has participated in a number of competitions including the urban construction of Varna's Center, the National Sports Hall, the urban construction of Pleven and Plovdiv, the centers of Pernik and Gabrovo, the Vuzrazhdane Square in Sofia, the International Contest for the Center of Berlin, and many others.

The directorate he headed provided on a high professional level urban construction solutions for the Manastirski Livadi, Ovcha Kupel and other residential complexes programmed for the seventh and eighth five-year plans.

Prior to his appointment as chairman of the Committee for Architecture and Public Works of the Council of Ministers, Architect Stefan Staynov was director of the Genplan Directorate of the Sofproekt Complex Design and Planning Institute. As head of the directorate he successfully organized the formulation of the general plan of Sofia, consistent with the latest party and governmental decisions.



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BULGARIA

REPORT ON THE UNION OF ARCHITECTS' FOURTH CONGRESS

Sofia STROTEL in Bulgarian 18 May 77 pp 1, 3

[Report by Sarika Veleva: "For a Mature Socialist Architecture; Fourth Congress of the Union of Architects in Bulgaria"]

[Text] The Fourth Congress of the Union of Architects in Bulgaria completed its two-day proceedings. Over 520 representatives of the creative union discussed successes and problems in the field of the most lasting of arts--architecture. Their thoughts and feelings during the congress and only a few days preceding the Third Congress of Bulgarian Culture were the thoughts and feelings of enthusiastic builders of the developed socialist society.

The successes achieved by Bulgarian architecture are inseparable from the successes of our country particularly in recent years. The adopted program for the further development of the country in the seventh five-year plan offered new possibilities for an even greater upsurge in the development of our architecture. The prospects of both the Bulgarian people and Bulgarian architects were clearly earmarked at the 11th BCP Congress and July Central Committee Plenum. The decisions of the March BCP Central Committee Plenum which dealt with the further development and improvement of Bulgaria's territorial and settlement structure will have a great impact on the development of our socialist architecture.

Congress delegates included Grisha Filipov, BCP Central Committee secretary and Politburo member, Ivan Mikhaylov, BCP Central Committee Politburo member, Georgi Stoilov, head of the Construction and Architecture Department, BCP Central Committee, Georgi Andreev, secretary of the Fatherland Front National Council and BZNS Standing Committee, Ivan Todorov, chairman of the Central Council of the Construction and Construction Materials Workers Trade Union, and heads of scientific and creative unions.

The greeting of the BCP Central Committee was read by Grigor Stoichkov, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and chairman of the Council for

Territorial and Settlement Structure (published separately). The greeting was heard with profound attention and drew lengthy applause.

In the course of their work the delegates studied and discussed the report on the activities of the Union of Architects in Bulgaria, read by the Union's chairman Honored Architect Professor Metodi Pisarski.

The Union of Architects in Bulgaria held its congress having rallied its forces in full unity with the April policy of the Bulgarian Communist Party and its Central Committee and, above all, the party's Central Committee first secretary and architect of the developed socialist society in our country Comrade Todor Zhivkov, Metodi Pisarski said.

The speaker further emphasized that currently the duties of the Bulgarian architects stem from the main social task of upgrading the living standard of the people. Architecture, most closely linked with life, is acquiring a real social content. Along with the solution of technical and economic problems related to architecture, problems related to its functions, content, and purpose of meeting the comprehensive needs stemming from human functions are becoming most fully apparent. The human and artistic-aesthetic aspects of architecture are acquiring today even greater significance, for it is precisely such qualities that must represent one of its characteristic features of the developed socialist society--a human and beautiful architecture.

We are dedicating particular concern in the construction of public buildings in residential areas--children's institutions, schools, youth clubs and homes, public services, trade, public health, and cultural structures, and others. Comprehensive social services are becoming to an ever greater extent one of the characteristic features of our settlements. They are penetrating all realms of human activities, including industrial territories. In this respect, the speaker stated, series of designs were completed. Together with the Union of Architects in Bulgaria KNIPITIS [Complex Scientific Research and Design Institute for Construction Standardization and Industrialization] organized a major exhibit of plans and materials for the construction of public services projects. Designs for children's institutions were elaborated as well with standardized separate sections and blocks which could be combined in a great number of variants. Some such buildings have even become the objects of scientific study on the part of the members of the young architects section.

It is a pleasing phenomenon that most youth houses in our country have been designed by young architects.

Activities in the designing and building of commercial buildings and establishments have been expanded as well.

The speaker then noted the problems facing the Bulgarian architects. He gave priority to the further development and improvement of territorial and settlement structures in building a comprehensive and harmonious spatial living environment.

The report emphasized the successes and problems of the restoration and preservation of architectural monuments, and the synthesis between architecture and the other plastic arts. The speaker also discussed the building of settlement systems and the unquestionable successes achieved in socialist urban construction.

Particular emphasis was placed on housing construction--a strategic task at the present stage of Bulgarian architecture. This five-year plan 470 thousand housing units will be built. A total of 1.6 million housing units will be built by the end of 1990. Such mass construction faces Bulgarian architects with numerous obligations.

The speaker then discussed the successes and problems of industrial construction, improvements of resting conditions, and comprehensive public services. He emphasized the great significance acquired by the science of architecture and the absolute need for the prompt popularization of scientific developments and their faster practical utilization. The great importance of architectural contests was noted as well.

In the period under consideration the joint work of the Union of Architects in Bulgaria and the Committee for Art and Culture, the former Ministry of Construction and Architecture, the Committee for Science, Technical Progress, and Higher Education, and the creative unions and people's councils was improved and increased.

During that period the Union of Architects in Bulgaria intensified its international contacts. Relations with the Union of Soviet Architects are developing particularly favorably.

Concluding, Professor Architect Metodi Pisarski said:

"The balance we have drawn is encouraging but imposes obligations as well. We must rapidly and decisively surmount the weaknesses allowed in our work and mobilize all our creative forces for the implementation of the tasks set by the 11th BCP Congress and the July and March Central Committee Plenums."

Architect Todor Karastoyanov, chairman of the Central Control-Auditing Commission, submitted the commission's report.

Peyo Berbenliev, deputy chairman of the Committee for Art and Culture, read the committee's greeting which wished the architects new, creative successes.

Nikolay Ulas, secretary of the Union of Soviet Architects, greeted his Bulgarian colleagues and emphasized the great friendship and intensified creative relations between the two unions.

Best wishes for fruitful work in new accomplishments in the field of architecture were presented by the heads and representatives of the unions of Bulgarian painters, Bulgarian writers, scientific workers, actors, composers, motion picture workers, and journalists.

Twice Hero of Socialist Labor Stefan Rangelov read the greeting of the Central Committee of the Trade Union of Construction and Construction Industry Workers.

In their statements the delegates to the congress discussed the creative work of the architect in all its aspects. Hero of Socialist Labor Architect Aleksandur Obretenov spoke of the quality of architecture. He was followed by Nikola Nikolov, Todor Vulev, Dimitur Vasilev, Stefan Staynov, Margarita Todorova, Dimitur Rimalovski, Petur Tashev, Dimitur Ganev, Dimo Angelov, Konstantin Petrov, Todor Topliyski, Lyubomir Bonev, Svetozar Panayotov, Kiril Ruskov, Ivan Gendzhov, Aleksandur Barov, Yanka Dobreva, and many others.

Addressing the congress, the delegates spoke of directing even more emphatically creative architectural work toward the creation of prerequisites for the comprehensive and harmonious development of the living environment, and the categorical promotion of industrialization, typification, standardization, and unification on the basis of qualitatively new principles. They expressed the desire of the Bulgarian architects to carry out the party's decisions and build a comprehensive, highly effective spatial environment which would contribute to upgrading the living standard of the people and promote the socialist way of life.

The results of the elections for a central management were announced at the final session of the Fourth Congress, attended by Grigor Stoichkov, Council of Minister's deputy chairman, and chairman of the Union for Territorial and Settlement Organization.

Architect Georgi Stoilov, head of the Construction and Architecture Department, BCP Central Committee, was elected chairman of the Union of Architects in Bulgaria.

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BULGARIA

BCP CENTRAL COMMITTEE GREETINGS TO FOURTH CONGRESS OF ARCHITECTS' UNION

Sofia STROITEL in Bulgarian 18 May 77 pp 1, 3

[Greeting of the BCP Central Committee presented by Grigor Stoichkov, Council of Ministers deputy chairman]

[Text] Dear Architects! Comrades:

The BCP Central Committee greets you most warmly on the occasion of the Fourth Congress of the Union of Bulgarian Architects, wishing you--delegates to the congress and all architects--new and even greater successes in the development of our socialist architecture and in the struggle for the further blossoming of our dear socialist fatherland--the Bulgarian People's Republic.

The party's Central Committee believes that the Fourth Congress of the Union of Bulgarian Architects is of exceptional importance to the further development of our national architecture as well as the development of a living environment related to the developed socialist society in our country.

The importance of the congress is determined also by the fact that it is taking place in the course of intensified political and labor activeness triggered by the historical decisions of the 11th Congress and the BCP Central Committee July and March Plenums.

History has shown that architecture has always played an important role in the development of society. This is confirmed by entire epochs and a number of masterpieces of architectural construction since ancient times. That is why it is no accident that architecture has been described as the "stone chronicle of mankind." Through its scale, proportions, rhythm, and colors it has always had a direct, aesthetic impact on the individual and society, promoting a feeling of national pride in all generations.

The accelerated development of our country following the April party plenum and the profound changes which occurred in social life faced the Bulgarian architects with the task of resolving exceptionally important and responsible problems. Resolving them, architecture is actively participating in the creation of a comprehensive, expedient, and aesthetic living environment

which contributes to the development of the socialist society. After the Third Congress of Architects a number of buildings and complexes were the results of the creative daring of Bulgarian architects. They gained social recognition both in Bulgaria and abroad. The Devnya Chemical Complex, the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant, capacities at Bobov Dol and Maritsa-Iztok, the Sviloza Combine, and others were added to the industrial map of the homeland.

The following are accomplishments of Bulgarian architecture: the Boyana governmental complex, the opera house in Stara Zagora, the Ivan Vazov National Library in Plovdiv, the reconstruction of the Ivan Vazov National Theater, and others.

During that period the base of higher educational institutions, schools, children's institutions, and commercial and public services facilities continued to be built. Housing construction was developed extensively.

Facilities for the recreation of the working people in our country continued to develop. The architectural appearance of Zlatni Pyasutsi, Slunchev Bryag, Albena, Pamporovo, and Borovets was enriched with new buildings. Such resorts are considered among the best in the world. Such new buildings revealed more vividly the new and more advanced features of architecture and construction.

Definite successes have been achieved in the field of construction standardization and industrialization. Facilities and possibilities for industrial construction were broadened. We converted decisively from the standardization of entire buildings to that of separate parts of buildings.

The industrialized construction systems used for the construction of buildings and complexes substantially broadened the possibilities for developing a varied architecture. The functional and artistic-aesthetic qualities of the project improved.

A number of examples could be cited in this respect: the dormitories of the University City in Sofia, the residential complexes Yordan Lyutibrodski in Vratsa, Georgi Petleshev in Varna, Triugulnika in Veliko Turnovo, and Izgrev and P. R. Slaveykov in Burgas, and others.

With every passing day the cities and villages of the homeland are radically changing their appearance. Currently they consist of a number of well planned squares, streets, gardens, parks, housing and public buildings, and complexes and ensembles.

Considerable progress was made in the territorial-structural planning of the country. Architects actively participated in the formulation of the unified territorial structure plan of the Bulgarian People's Republic and its related subsystems in the areas of labor, residence, recreation, comprehensive public services and technical infrastructure, the territorial-structural plan of the Black Sea Coast, and others, which create conditions for the proper and comprehensive development of the living environment.

The successes achieved in urban construction planning were determined also by accomplishments such as the directival plan for Sofia, the general urban construction plans of Varna, Ruse, Yambol, Smolyan, the central area of Plovdiv, and others.

The achievements in blending architecture with the other arts made a considerable contribution to the solution of ideological, aesthetic, and educational problems in shaping the architectural-artistic appearance of the living environment. In this respect good joint work was done by architects, painters, and sculptors, as the result of which designs, stained glass, wood cuts, ceramics, mosaics, reliefs, and others are being used more extensively. Positive examples in this respect are the opera house in Stara Zagora, the Apriltsi Memorial Complex in Panagyurishte, the common grave in Plovdiv, the Central Railway Station in Sofia, the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant, and others.

Our country is proud of the fact that talented designers--architects and engineers--have won a number of international competitions and have created significant one of a kind works of architecture abroad, and made their contribution to the strengthening of the prestige of Bulgarian architecture. Thanks to their talent and creative skill, today the Bulgarian People's Republic is a sought after architectural partner by many countries such as Cuba, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Syria, Afghanistan, the GDR, Nigeria, and others.

We are fully justified today in saying that our transformed homeland is also the result of the inspired work and creative activities of designers who, united and unreservedly loyal to the party's policy, accomplished great and heroic projects. They are the creators and personnel of the Glavproekt and Sofproekt study and design institutes, the zonal design organizations in Sofia, Plovdiv, Burgas, Varna, and Veliko Turnovo, the design branches of construction and installation combines, and the industrial design institutes.

The Complex Scientific Research and Design Institute for territorial structure, urban construction, and architecture, and the Complex Scientific Research and Design Institute for Construction Standardization and Industrialization have made a considerable contribution to the further improvement and development of territorial and settlement structure and standardization.

The Union of Architects has given four people's architects, 24 honored architects and cultural leaders, four heroes of socialist labor, 64 Dimitrov Prize laureates, and many order and medal bearers. Noted among them are Architect Ivan Vasil'ov, Professor Todor Zlatev, Architect Petur Kantardzhiev, Architect Nikola Nikolov, Professor Architect Aleksandur Obretenov, Architect Milena Yordanova, Architect Aleksandur Barov, and others.

All this leads us to emphasize that the Union of Architects has made a contribution to such successes, to the development of architecture, and to the enrichment of past architectural traditions by giving them a socialist content.

The union's sections on "Territorial Structure, Urban Construction, and Landscape Architecture, Public Buildings, Architectural Theory and Criticism, Residential Buildings and Complexes, Industrial Buildings and Complexes, and New Methods in Design and Construction have played a positive role in the development and popularization of achievements in the various lines of architecture.

For this reason, let us congratulate architects, engineers, technicians, and workers in the field of architecture for their contribution to the struggle for the building of a new socialist panoramic view of the Bulgarian People's Republic.

Comrades:

The stage of development of our country under the conditions of the mature socialist society face Bulgarian architecture with the task of building a comprehensive highly effective living environment which would contribute to upgrading the living standard of the people and the assertion of the socialist way of life.

Proceeding from the increased social needs and requirements, let us emphasize that Bulgarian architecture is still not fully in step with the tasks set at the 11th Congress and July BCP Central Committee Plenum.

As was noted at the March BCP Central Committee Plenum, we see in the territorial and settlement structure and urban construction a disproportion between the accelerated development of the living standard and the need for the comprehensive development of the living environment related to it. Projects in the realms of labor, habitation, recreation, public services, and the technical infrastructure were developed disproportionately. In some areas the ecological balance was disturbed substantially.

There has been a lagging in the elaboration of urban construction plans for many settlements. Currently a large percentage of settlements have no plans. Furthermore, a number of urban construction plans become prematurely obsolete. This hinders the prompt supply of designs and building areas for construction work.

Territorial structure and urban construction were not used to the necessary extent in controlling migration processes, purposeful distribution of the population on the territory, and the improvement of the country's network of settlements.

Standardization is not being applied adequately and creatively as the basic method of work of design institutes and organizations. Under industrialized construction conditions it must play a decisive role in the shaping of our new socialist agriculture, upgrading the productivity and quality of design, improving and rationalizing construction processes, and reducing the time and improving the quality of construction.

Some design organizations display a formalistic attitude in the use of current catalogues and nomenclatures. Insufficient use is being made of the existing possibilities they offer to achieve architectural variety. The result is the monotony of buildings and complexes built through the industrial construction method.

Unjustifiably, some 46 different types of construction systems are being used in residential, public, industrial, and agricultural construction. There are 22 varieties in large-panel housing construction alone. Despite the multiplicity of systems, however, the necessary architectural effect has not been reached.

This also explains the fact that the level of prefabricated parts is low in mass industrialized construction; there is a large number of labor intensive wet processes and the quality of construction is unsatisfactory. In the final account, the necessary prerequisites for sectorial and territorial specialization and concentration and for reaching a multiplication effect are not achieved in the development of the production and technical base related to industrialized construction systems. Conditions for technological assembly line work in the construction process itself are not secured.

In some important architectural lines such as territorial and settlement structure, urban construction, standardization, cataloguing, and others there are no trained cadres.

Many organizations underestimate problems related to upgrading cadre skills so that they may meet the requirements of the stage of our development. In this respect the possibilities of the Union of Architects have not been fully used.

Basic research in the field of architectural theory and history is insufficiently guiding and timely. Most of the studies are not related to the activities of scientific research and design institutes and organizations.

Contests are poorly used as an effective method for the elaboration of designs with optimal and proven architectural and aesthetic qualities. Such competitions are not always focused on the solution of central problems of decisive importance to the successful implementation of the projects included in the construction program.

Practical experience has shown that our noted architects focus their efforts mainly on designing individual one of a kind buildings and failed to make their contribution to resolving architectural problems in mass industrialized construction.

In accordance with the decisions of the 11th BCP Congress and the great program for building a developed socialist society, architecture has been assigned a specific role in creating most favorable living conditions for

society. This calls for a type of Bulgarian socialist architecture consistent with the nature of our conditions.

In other words, anything being built must be beautiful. It must fully meet the needs of our time. In the past, when construction equipment and output were primitive and developed on the basis of manual artisan production, the question was resolved by itself naturally: the designer and the builder were one of the same--the master builder. He was fully responsible for the comforts and beauty of the building, for its strength, cost, and completion deadline. At that time architecture was combined with the other arts to a considerable extent.

This is no longer possible under contemporary conditions, for the volume of construction has reached tremendous dimensions. Therefore, it is entirely natural for construction output to become industrialized. Industrialized production is based on the mass serial output of finished goods combined within construction systems. Their end result is the creation of a modern environment in which a person may live, work, and rest. No individual or group of master builders could carry out such a task.

Naturally, this is not to say that architecture as an art in which utility and beauty are inseparable has come to an end, that only functionality and technology remain, while everything else is a vestige or a whim. On the contrary, our society has created all the necessary conditions for architecture truly to develop as the art of construction leaving lasting monuments to the present and future generations. That is why the words of Comrade Todor Zhivkov are so powerful. He said that the path to communism is a path to beauty. In other words, the prosperity of man in the higher stages of socialism is inconceivable without comforts and beauty. Consequently, there is no other way. Under industrialization conditions as well architecture remains the art of construction which must fulfill a construction task with artistic creativity.

The main objective of our architecture at its present stage of development is the creation of the comprehensive, expedient, and aesthetic living environment for the optimal development of the socialist society.

Today architectural creativity is becoming a high governmental affair, a part of the national policy. The architect must assume the role of the main coordinator of the spatial organization of the environment at all its levels--territorial structure, urban construction, and architecture.

This is the basis for the major and responsible tasks facing Bulgarian architecture. What are they?

First. Above all, implementing the basic directions adopted at the March BCP Central Committee Plenum, problems of territorial and settlement structure must be resolved on a qualitatively new basis. These problems are considered as a comprehensive activity aimed at the effective organization

of the territory and the utilization of resources, the rational location of the various projects of material and non-production projects, and their combined and cooperated construction with a view to the development of a harmonious living environment.

On the basis of the plenum's decisions on improving the network of settlements in the country an essentially new approach must be applied in its planning, development, and building the foundations of settlement systems. In this connection, in accordance with the program approved by the Council of Ministers, together with the okrug people's councils and departments, the scientific research institutes and design organizations must develop extensive efforts to shape the settlement systems and insure their effective, comprehensive building. They must program and bring up to date and improve the subsystems related to settlement systems in the areas of labor, habitation, comprehensive public services, recreation, and technical infrastructure.

Along with the clarification and determination of territories suitable for the population's recreation, they must elaborate territorial structure and urban construction plans for the modernization and reconstruction of existing resort areas and settlements offering conditions for recreation within the boundaries of settlement systems.

On the basis of a long-term program they must undertake the gradual elaboration and supply of developed settlement systems with territorial structure and urban construction plans.

They must bring up to date, improve, and make consistent with the new requirements the existing legal base in the field of territorial and settlement structure, architecture, and design.

Second. The further improvement and development of territorial-structure and architectural-construction design must be based on a unified catalogue system. Such a system must be elaborated on the basis of the functional standardization of projects in the realms of labor, recreation, public services, and technical infrastructure and typification and standardization of construction systems for buildings and equipment and construction output. To this effect the architects must focus their efforts on the following:

Functional standardization of structural elements of settlement systems and their normative regulation;

Clarification of the functions and content of projects for labor, habitation, public services, recreation, and technical infrastructure;

Creation of unified construction systems;

Elaboration of a unified catalogue system and providing all the necessary prerequisites for its application which should begin as early as the seventh five-year plan.

This will optimize design solutions in construction, insure the multiple-variant designing of buildings, installations, and complexes, constructed on the basis of industrialized building systems, achieve an individuality in the architectural-artistic development of settlements, and achieve considerable economic, social, architectural, and ecological results in developing the living environment related to the shaping of settlement systems.

Third. Another important task is the further development and improvement of the architecture of buildings and equipment under the conditions of industrialized construction in such a way as to enable it properly to reflect the characteristic features, way of life, and spirituality of the person of the socialist epoch. Profound and all-round scientific studies should determine the processes and changes occurring in the organization and structure of the socialist society and predict their future development. Briefly stated, this means the following: a modern socialist architecture must correspond to the socialist nation and its way of life.

These requirements face architecture with the solution of problems related to the following:

Organization of functions in buildings and creation of prerequisites for their proper exploitation;

Molding new spatial structures with modern elements in their architectural appearance;

Use of technical progress in construction;

Optimal solution of the basic economic problems of society such as economy of territory, time, materials, labor, and energy;

Insuring the comprehensive building of projects in the realms of labor, habitation, recreation, comprehensive public services, and technical infrastructure;

Proper and harmonious combination of the architectural appearance of buildings and complexes with the environment;

Achieving harmonious synthesis between architecture and other arts, protection and development of the national heritage, and others.

Furthermore, architecture must contribute to the development and proper solution of the problem of blending architecture with the monumental-decorative arts under the conditions of mass industrialized construction.

For this reason, at the present stage we must upgrade the role of chief architects and make their activities consistent with the tasks facing the people's councils in the fields of territorial and settlement structure and architecture, stemming from the March plenum.

Fourth. Science plays an important and responsible role in the development of Bulgarian architecture. With the new tasks the science of architecture must face the elaboration of current and future problems related to the unified territorial-structural plan of the Bulgarian People's Republic and its systems, urban construction and architecture, and development of integration among the individual scientific units in the field of capital construction with a view to insuring total research comprehensiveness. We must promote the extensive integration between the science of architecture and the powerful institutions in the Soviet Union; we must insure the fast utilization of obtained scientific results by improving and creating a broad legal base and their utilization in industrialized construction systems.

Particular attention should be paid to studies in the field of the specific features of architectural creative work, use of mathematical methods, socialist research, forecasting, the development of construction standardization and industrialization, knowledge of art, and development of architectural theory and criticism.

Fifth. The training of cadres working in this sector of importance to the national economy plays a decisive role in the implementation of tasks in the fields of architecture and construction. That is why, with the participation of the Union of Architects, we must improve the training system and create an efficient organization for the retraining and specialization of scientific and design cadres working in the fields of territorial structure, urban construction, architecture, and construction standardization and industrialization.

The Union of Architects in Bulgaria plays an important role in the solution of these problems, as a social and creative organization. On the basis of the social-state principle, and together with the Ministry of Construction and Architecture and the Committee for Art and Culture, it must contribute to upgrading the skills and creative manifestation of architectural cadres. It must actively participate in determining the directions and development of Bulgarian architecture, the popularization of its achievements, the strengthening of its international prestige, and its reaching the level of the tasks set by the party and the government in building a developed socialist society in our country.

We are deeply convinced that the Union of Architects in Bulgaria will continue, as it has in the past, to participate actively in the implementation of the construction program as the basis for the further socioeconomic development of the country. The union's entire work will reach a qualitatively new level consistent with the stipulations of the 11th Congress and the July and March BCP Central Committee Plenums.

The party's Central Committee is fully convinced that all the members of the Union of Architects, who have frequently proved their love for our splendid toiling people and their inflexible loyalty to the party and the government, will continue to work even more adamantly in the spirit of the requirements of the 11th Party Congress for the further socioeconomic development of the country and the implementation of the resolutions of this congress.

This is guaranteed by the fact that our country has a unified labor and creative collective of architects armed with experience, knowledge, possibilities, and the willingness to carry out the party's tasks.

We are firmly convinced that, firmly rallied around the Central Committee line, with even greater creative daring and love, the with even greater warmth and enthusiasm, inherent in the creative profession of the architect, you will dedicate your forces and skills to the further blossoming of our dear socialist homeland--the Bulgarian People's Republic.

5003
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Sofia STROITEL in Bulgarian 18 May 77 p 1

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EAST GERMANY

ARMY'S IDEOLOGY AND INDOCTRINATION ANALYZED

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[Article by Guenter Rahn, doctoral candidate under Prof Dr Jacobsen at the seminar for political science, Bonn University (thesis: 'The Image of Germany in the Textbooks of the GDR (1966-1973)'): "The Image of the Enemy for the National People's Army in Socialist Military Training"]

[Text] 1. What the National People's Army Thinks of Itself

To describe the function and content of the National People's Army's image of the enemy we must briefly outline the way in which the NVA [National People's Army] thinks of itself and, in connection with this, socialist defense training.

Being a soldier in the NVA means "being a soldier of an invincible army" (1). The character of the NVA can be determined by six factors:

1. The NVA is the "socialist army of the first German worker-and-peasant state, the GDR." It is the "armed organ of the workers, led by the working class, for the protection of the socialist system, socialist gains, and the peaceful life of the citizens of the GDR" (2). The protective function of the NVA is reflected also in the oath on the flag, in terms of "defending socialism against all enemies" (3). The defensive motive behind the protection of socialism however is not confined to the GDR; instead, the NVA soldier pledges to protect socialism also on an international scale:

"The mission of the socialist fighting forces today goes far beyond the boundaries of the individual socialist country. For the past 2 decades, it has included the reliable military protection of the entire community of socialist states on the level of modern military science. It demands the collectively expressed readiness and ability of all socialist brother armies to stand up for the entire socialist community with weapon in hand and to stand up for one's own people likewise" (4).

2. The national element of the NVA today recedes behind the socialist element. Until the end of the sixties, the national element sprang from the so-called national mission of the GDR (5). Under the conditions of the existence of two German states, the NVA got a "national liberation mission" which was aimed at the FRG (6). In that sense, the NVA embodies the military-political aspect of the policy for Germany (7). Since the Eighth

SED Congress, the GDR--as it made clear in the comments on the national issue and especially in the new 1975 Constitution--no longer views itself as the core state of a reunited Germany of the future but rather as a part of the community of socialist states which sharply dissociates itself from the FRG (8). Consequently, point 4, listed below, assumes even more importance in terms of the self-image.

3. Leadership through the SED is referred to as the source of the NVA's strength and invincibility (9). The NVA accomplishes "its revolutionary class mission under the leadership of its Marxist-Leninist Party, the SED"; it acts "in all situations and at all times according to the resolutions and directives of the SED Central Committee and the government leadership as well as the will of the people of the GDR" (10).

4. "Another source of the NVA's strength" resides in its close bonds with the Soviet Army (11). The Soviet Army is considered a model for the NVA. The military doctrine of the NVA is the "uniform military doctrine" of the "socialist military coalition" of the Warsaw Pact (12). This dependence is furthermore expressed in the adoption of the structure and organizational principles and the basic principles of political education and military training. In addition we have the adoption of Soviet weapons systems and military gear (13).

5. The NVA is not "a state within the state"; instead, there is a "unity of people and army" (14). In terms of socialist defense training, this means, last but not least, that, with regard to its essence and its content, it is identical for members of the NVA and for other GDR citizens (15).

6. For a while, until 1968 at least, until socialist defense training was tightened up, the NVA considered itself a political training school for the nation. The NVA exerted "the most essential influence" on the process of the development and consolidation of the socialist defense idea (16). Critical main points were to be found in the area of fighting against pacifism, preparations for the fight against imperialism, the struggle against subversion, and the fight against defense fatigue.

2. Socialist Defense Training

"Socialist defense training is the totality of the educational, self-educational, and training measures and influencing factors aimed at developing the readiness to strengthen and defend the socialist fatherland and to create prerequisites for defense capability" (17). From the third year onward, the GDR citizen is included in a system of socialist defense education. In kindergarten and grade school and, parallel to this, with the Young Pioneers and the FDJ [Free German Youth], he is intensively influenced by political-ideological education. At the same time, as of the age of 16, he gets military-technical preparation for duty with the NVA in the Society for Sports and Technology. Socialist defense education does not end after an individual has served his obligatory term in the NVA. It also includes the reservist's preservation of defense capability. The second, even more important factor--ideological persuasion--serves to clarify the defense motive and thus simultaneously consolidates the

defense determination, defense readiness, and defense capability (18). Foundations of the legitimacy of the defense motive and the fighting mission of the NVA can be found in the "permanent aggressiveness of imperialism." That is the nucleus of the NVA's image of the enemy.

3. The Ideological Friend-Foe Image

Due to the class struggle situation, the socialist citizen supposedly needs "a clear friend-foe image in order to recognize the class allies and the class enemy of the socialist fatherland and in order to be able to act accordingly" (19). The friend-foe image is shaped by the interest of the working class: strengthening the socialist fatherland and the community of socialist states (20). Socialist defense education has six objectives to develop the class-oriented friend-foe image (21):

1. Firm political commitment for State and party.
2. Individual interests must be in line with the interests of the socialist fatherland.
3. Friendship with the socialist peoples.
4. Solidarity with all progressive forces.
5. Socialist perspective consciousness.
6. Hatred against the class enemy, especially the mortal enemy, West German imperialism.

The question as to the friend has primacy because here we find the "perspective and certainty of victory over the enemy" (22). Theoretically, the illustration of the enemy is based on Lenin's theory of imperialism and the teaching of the proletarian revolution (23). Specifically, this involves three things:

1. Characterization of aggressiveness as objective feature of monopoly rule.
2. Justification of possibility and necessity of peaceful coexistence and the role played by the armed forces here.
3. Starting with the general crisis of capitalism, realistic and differentiated evaluation of NATO and its chief partners (24).

The enemy image is an element of ideology and is expressed in the partisan evaluation of the enemy. With the passage of time it is condensed "into a reality which covers reality such as it really is" (25).

4. The Enemy Image

4.1. The Concept of Aggression

Aggression is considered one of the main methods of the foreign and military policies of imperialist states (26). The state is considered the aggressor

who is the first to employ his fighting power against another state under any pretext whatsoever (27).

In addition to this form of direct aggression, the GDR also distinguishes indirect aggression, that is to say, subversive activity and border provocations, as well as acts of economic aggression, that is to say, the exercise of economic pressure. Another point is ideological aggression which consists primarily in ideological diversion. The concept of aggression furthermore includes acts of juridical aggression which means the arrogation of legal authority toward GDR citizens.

4.2. FRG as Center of Enemy Image

The thesis of the imperialist war threat, of the aggressiveness of imperialism, which the GDR constantly faces as a fighter for freedom, decisively determines the image of the FRG. Above all, the FRG "has become the main center of the danger of war in Europe" (28). From the GDR viewpoint this is due to the fact that the FRG is supposedly trying to spread its sphere of power, whereby war preparations are directed against the GDR.

4.3. The West German Armed Forces

According to the Marxist-Leninist view, the character and function of the armed forces are determined by the character of the social system and the state whose instrument they are. Accordingly, the Bundeswehr [West German Armed Forces] is "a faithful reflection of the state-monopoly system of rule in West Germany" (29). To the extent that the army permits conclusions as to the state's character, the analysis of the army's military combat mission provides hints as to the state's political objectives. This necessarily leads to a situation where the West German Armed Forces assume an outstanding role in GDR literature for the purpose of:

- (a) differentiating the NVA from the Bundeswehr in order to achieve the most extreme polarization possible,
- (b) to illustrate the enemy image even more clearly for NVA personnel.

This partly explains the peculiarities in GDR propaganda language. An attempt is made, through constant repetition of adjectives, to indoctrinate an enemy image describing the alleged properties and qualities of the enemy. The Bundeswehr is characterized by such attributes as antisocialist, anti-national, reaction, fascist, and aggressive (30). Anticommunism is perceived as the sustaining ideological concept for the education of the West German soldier (31). The Bundeswehr supposedly has the mission of triggering an aggressive war by surprise which can be detected, in the GDR view, from its doctrine, structure, armament and equipment, training and education, and its role in NATO. It is therefore supposedly logical that "West German military personnel are the enemies of every soldier of the National People's Army" (32).

4.4. War of Brother Against Brother

Because of the confrontation between the GDR and the FRG, the SED faces the problem that a future war would be a war between Germans. The goal

of socialist defense education therefore is to influence all members of the NVA in such a manner that they would not interpret a war between the GDR and the FRG as a war between brothers. The criterion by means of which "good" and "bad" Germans are distinguished from each other is the question "In what class interest the individual acts consciously or unconsciously." From that it is concluded that not every German "can be our friend, our brother" (33). For the GDR it is however not enough that the NVA soldier displays his fundamental readiness, upon command of the worker-and-peasant government, at all times resolutely and uncompromisingly to conduct the fight until the annihilation of the West German Armed Forces. Instead, the enemy image must be so fundamentally further motivated in the NVA soldier that, even in peace time, he will meet the enemy with a hatred that is guided by the enemy's aggression plans, by his inhumanity, and the threatening danger of war (34).

4.5. Education in Hate

This education in hating however is not a special feature for the military sector; instead, hatred, which has "an ethical-moral quality," and the image of the enemy are included in the social system of ethics and in the developed socialist personality (35). In this connection it is emphasized that political-ideological education is all the more effective, "the more actively we act upon all aspects of the human psyche (reason, emotion, willpower, and others)" (36). Education in hating is aimed at two things: first of all, hatred is joined by "revulsion" against the FRG, against the West German Armed Forces, and finally against every member of the West German Armed Forces. Here, in the opinion of the SED, it is entirely immaterial whether the individual soldier of the West German Armed Forces is or is not aware that he is fighting for the "class enemy" (37). The idea also here is to develop a feeling of moral superiority over the enemy. The NVA soldier, who "has the sacred fighting mission of protecting peace" (38) supposedly faces a soldier in whom "all decent and clean feelings of an honest individual had been killed and in whom there has been developed a blind hatred against all that is good and progressive, against socialism and peace" (39).

Besides, education in hating generates a determination to destroy which is directed against the possible enemy and that determination is most clearly expressed in the resoluteness "to destroy that enemy uncompromisingly" (40).

4.6. The Just War

The moral superiority factor is further stepped up by the evaluation of a future war. For the NVA, this war--forced upon it by imperialist aggression--would be the most just war, the most revolutionary war (41). A war of aggression on the other hand is categorized as an "imperialist predatory war," as the "most unjust war," from which one can derive corresponding statements about Western soldiers. Through this clear comparison the NVA soldier is supposed to understand clearly that there is no "nobler task" than to contribute to the final annihilation of the enemy (42).

4.7. Test Case for Effectiveness of Enemy Image

The criticism which is often expressed in the FRG with regard to GDR border protection under the heading of generosity and humanity is dismissed as a mere "phrase" on the basis of the perception of inhuman imperialism in the FRG and humane socialism in the GDR, a "phrase" which merely has an undermining function. "Nowadays, each passing day proves which social system and which policy are humana and which are inhuman" (43).

Because there are no other tangible enemies available at this time, the struggle against "those who flee from the Republic" and "deserters" is supposed to create the conditions in terms of consciousness and willpower which will enable the NVA soldier to be ready, on command of the SED, to destroy the FRG soldier regardless of any feelings of national or blood kinship. Thus, the execution of the order to fire becomes the criterion for the success of the influence exerted by political-ideological education; it becomes clear evidence for the demanded "internal bonds" between the individual and the GDR which, according to Hoffmann, must go all the way: "This is my State. It is as dear to me as my family, as my father and mother. Woe to him who dares touch it" (44).

4.8. Problem Complex of Enemy Image's Force of Conviction

This kind of sharply-pointed enemy image in socialist defense education does contain some dangers. Those dangers become obvious when the enemy image, based on the premises of ideological and military confrontation, is overtaxed with relation to the interpretation capability of its statements, by a policy which undertakes differentiations in groups of persons hitherto designated as enemies. A resultant relativization of the enemy image--such as it might take place, for example, in case of cooperation with Western countries--would go at the expense of the credibility of the enemy image. Starting with the perception of the FRG's military doctrine, we now want to show how the SED upheld its enemy image from 1966 until the beginning of 1976 from the viewpoint of ideological irreconcilability.

5. The FRG Military Doctrine

5.1. Definition of GDR

According to the SED, a state's military doctrine is directly dependent on the character of the particular system of government, on the class conditions prevailing throughout the land, on the domestic and foreign policy objectives and on the economic, political-moral, and cultural condition of the state (45). Specifically for the FRG, this generally valid definition means the following: the FRG's war doctrine is a system of governmentally recognized basic principles and guiding ideas on the political and military character of a future war (46). It expresses the attitude of the ruling monopoly groupings in the state monopoly government system toward war. The doctrine of aggression contains the official views on the possible types of war, on the forms and methods of triggering the war, as well as the thought-out course of war (47). War doctrine spells

out the role and position of the FRG in NATO. The doctrine also includes the basic principles of warfare and the conduct of the struggle with the corresponding ideas and requirements for the preparation of the Bundeswehr and the FRG for war within the NATO framework (48).

Two sides--the political and the military-technical sides--are distinguished within the doctrine of war. As the GDR sees it, the political component has priority (49) and the emphasis is to be placed here.

5.2. Enemy Image During Grand Coalition

5.2.1. Estimate of Government of Grand Coalition

In addition to the emphasis on the rise of neonazism in the FRG, it was observed that the revenge policy of the West German State had entered a new stage with the formation of the Grand Coalition (50). The aggravation of the situation was explained by saying that the participation of SPD ministers was intended to isolate the GDR from its allies and to make it ripe for assault (51). The strategic concept--inseparably tied to the doctrine of war--was supposed to be the strategy of the calculated risk (52).

5.2.2. The Enemy Image Up To Intervention in Czechoslovakia

During the period of the Grand Coalition, the West German Government tried to arrive at a detente with the Soviet Union and the other socialist states. Offers extended to economic and political issues. The SED's interpretation model however revealed a different picture. The FRG--whose war doctrine supposedly essentially agreed with that of the United States and whose modified expansion program fits organizationally into American global strategy (53)--allegedly harbors aggressive intentions against the socialist countries but especially against the GDR (54). The policy of approach and cooperation therefore has definitely hostile character. The FRG, they maintained, supposedly realized that a direct confrontation with the GDR was no longer a good idea. The Government of the Grand Coalition now supposedly is trying to attain the old goals with new tactical means (55). In so doing it employs a combination of political, economic, ideological, and military instruments and this, together, is summarized under the concept of "policy of the calculated risk" (56). It is expressed in the flexible Eastern Policy. The following speculative steps of aggression are seen from the GDR viewpoint:

1. Isolation of GDR in socialist camp.
2. Atomic and economic blackmail of USSR with the goal of reducing Soviet forces.
3. Softening up the GDR.
4. Conduct of actions which were summarized under the concept of "hidden warfare," "limited lightning campaign" against the GDR (57).

The last point was further expanded by saying that the policy of not recognizing the GDR, which Bonn was pursuing, offers a possibility of picturing military intervention as an internal German police action (58).

The goal of isolating the GDR was particularly emphasized in the enemy image during that period of time. The attempt by the West German Government to establish diplomatic relations with socialist countries was considered as a part of American global strategy tailored for Europe because "there is by no means a sharp dividing line between the 'peaceful' means of aggression on soft soles and the use of military force" (59).

5.2.3. From Intervention in Czechoslovakia to the Formation of the First Social-Liberal Coalition

For the SED, the events in Czechoslovakia prior to intervention by the Warsaw Pact countries was a model case for the implementation of West German aggression policy with such phases as bridge-building, period of tension, and forward strategy with escalation (60). Here, part of the intention was to get a more favorable deployment basis for the West German Armed Forces against the GDR. The Czechoslovak deviationists were discredited through the tie-in of the topic of reform communism with the topic of imperialism. The enemy image for the NVA was confirmed and supported by the interpretation pattern for events in Czechoslovakia. At the same time, the action against Czechoslovakia clarifies a cornerstone in the NVA's self-image, the dialectic of proletarian internationalism and socialist patriotism.

For the period of up to 1961, in my opinion, one can say that the GDR interpreted as aggressive actions all those factors which were supposed to serve detente. Hoffmann did of course acknowledge "certain tendencies of detente" but at the same time talked of an enemy "who seeks to camouflage his aggressive nature and his insidious objectives with great cleverness especially now" (61). This does not mean a reduction of the NVA's enemy image; instead, these statements allow the conclusion that the enemy was considered to be even more aggressive (62). The consequence was stepped-up ideological work in order to create a clear image of the enemy without any illusions.

5.3. Enemy Image, 1969-1972

5.3.1. First Evaluation of New Government

In October 1969, the SPD/FDP Coalition replaced the government of the Grand Coalition. The change in government in Bonn did not signify a change in power from the GDR viewpoint (64). The enemy image was intensified by the assertion that the Brandt/Scheel administration was, especially in the military-political area, trying to represent the aggressive objectives of West German imperialism even more strongly than at the time of the CDU/CSU Administration (65).

5.3.2. Effects on Enemy Image

Because a Social Democrat had become Federal Chancellor, there was one point in the enemy image which assumed considerable significance:

the threat from social democratism. This problem complex, in my opinion, can be boiled down to two questions for the SED leadership:

1. How great is the danger of softening up resulting from negotiations and agreements with Bonn?
2. How can one counter a reduction of the enemy image in case of a possible arrangement with Bonn?

For the SED, the essence of the softening-up danger resided in the fact that the RG was ready to enter into regulations within the meaning of the principles of peaceful coexistence although nothing would change in the essence of imperialism (66). To maintain the enemy image it was therefore necessary "to disclose the antihuman essence of imperialism even more completely and" to conduct an uncompromising struggle "against all variations of reaction ideology, including social democratism" (67).

5.3.3. Erfurt and Kassel

Shortly after Brandt and Stoph met in Erfurt, the danger of Eastern Europe's social democratization was mentioned repeatedly, that is to say, the imperialist undermining of socialism with clever means and methods in order thus to clear a breach for the West German Armed Forces (68). The newspaper VOLKSARMEE discussed the question as to whether the enemy image might not have to be cut back somewhat on the assumption that "those who negotiate don't shoot" (69). These tendencies were resolutely countered: at this point in time, the task is to be prepared for the toughest test in the class struggle (70) so that West German imperialism would have a possibility of creating a breach (71) neither with "tirades about humaneness" nor with "tirades about detente."

5.3.4. Dispute With Traditions of West German Armed Forces

One way to keep the enemy image going was the constant reference to the traditions nurtured by the West German Armed Forces in spite of all attempts at detente (72). These "reactionary traditions," within which "the heritage of the fascist armed forces is being maintained more and more openly" (73) permit certain conclusions as to the mission of the West German Armed Forces because the mission and tradition of the West German Armed Forces influence each other (74). The goal of education remained the same even during the social-liberal coalition: Education to war preparedness in the spirit of anticomunism and to create the ability to implement imperialism's expansive goals (75).

5.3.5. Up to the Formation of the Second Social-Liberal Coalition

The signing of the Moscow treaties in my opinion did not change the enemy image at all. Honecker declared: "There is not the slightest reason for taking anything away from the enemy image that is being transmitted to personnel of the NVA" (76). Instead, there was talk of an unremitting elevation of the ideological-theoretical level and the effectiveness of Marxist-Leninist training. After the signing of the basic treaty between the GDR and the FRG, the situation, it was said, did not

relax in any way but became worse "because peaceful coexistence is not the same as ideological coexistence" (77). To develop the enemy image, it is necessary, with full force of conviction, to continue to disclose the reactionary and antihuman essence of imperialism in which nothing has changed.

5.4. Enemy Image as of 1972

5.4.1. Estimate of Second Social-Liberal Coalition

The start of the Second Social-Liberal Coalition to my knowledge did not signify any change in the intensity of the enemy image (78). Although in the time between 1969 and 1972 the subversive activities of social democratism constituted one particularly emphasized point in the enemy image, the NATO aspect now seemed to come to the fore (79). The ideological subversive activity of imperialism, in the opinion of the SED, however continued to be one of the main threats of imperialism (80).

5.4.2. NATO

In the opinion of the GDR, the FRG since 1969 gave priority to measures strengthening and consolidating NATO (81). The goal of this NATO policy supposedly is to gear NATO to the so-called "double strategy" (82), that is to say, to a variable combination of foreign-policy-diplomatic actions and the principles of flexible military strategy (83). The tie-in of the FRG and the West German Armed Forces with NATO had always been a main component of the NVA's enemy image (84) because all perceived aggression actions were to be implemented within the framework of NATO. Recently however there has been a turn against a "certain tendency toward the one-sided emphasis on the FRG as against the other main powers of NATO (85). This meant a move away from the national focus of the enemy image and heavier stress on the multinational framework. The emphasis on NATO is connected with a demand for a "realistic" estimate of the enemy which was presented frequently at that time. There are two factors which play a role here, in my opinion. The removal of the national accent starting in 1972 revealed slow effects on the enemy image; at the same time, one could detect certain exogenous factors--the various agreements between the FRG and Eastern European States but also Geneva and Helsinki.

5.4.3. Reactions to CSCE

The CSCE, that is to say, the preliminary negotiations in Geneva and the summit meeting in Helsinki, was covered in great detail in the publications. Fundamental issues were discussed: "compromises in our foreign policy?" (86), "Do the treaties reduce the aggressiveness of the imperialists?" (87), but relatively objective information was also given (88).

All successes were credited to the account of the socialist states but there must not be any reduction in the enemy image because "we must constantly keep in mind that the enemies of detente, instead of lowering their sales, are stepping up their attacks" (89). This means a fixation of the enemy image, if not even an aggravation, because the methods of aggression--according to the SED--have become more refined.

5.4.4. Trojan Horse

During the period of the treaties between the FRG and the Eastern European states and the CSCE negotiations it was particularly difficult for the SED to uphold its usual enemy image for the NVA. The dilemma consisted in the fact that--to make one's own efforts credible--one had to credit politicians in Western countries with a sense of the so-called realities. On the other hand, it was ideologically impossible completely to drop the fundamental condemnation of capitalism and imperialism. The policy of the enemies was perceived (90) as a contradictory mixture of "realistic tendencies and adventurism."

"To the extent that we prevent the enemy from seeking refuge in military aggressions, to the extent that we persuade him to engage in peaceful co-existence, which is the form of international class conflict that we want, to that extent there will be an aggravation particularly in the struggle along the ideological front" (91). Just as in antiquity, Ulysses had the idea of the Trojan Horse, so the Western countries, especially the FRG, are today being accused of seeking--with ideological warfare, ideological aggressiveness, or ideological subversion--"to destroy or at least paralyze the political-moral and intellectual-ethical potential of the Warsaw Pact states" (92). This is why, in the defense-ethics education of the people and the army, it is important, particularly in imparting the enemy image, to make sure that "the thinking and feelings" of GDR youth "will be completely filled with the socialist spirit, with socialist values, that they will be armed, down to the very deepest layers, against the poison of anti-human imperialist ideology and immorality" (93).

5.4.5. "Realistically Thinking Forces"--"Reactionary Forces"

While the FRG continues to be charged with pursuing the Trojan Horse strategy, there has recently been some interesting reshuffling in the perceived relationship between "realistically thinking" and "reactionary, restorative, and revanchist forces," whereby the latter are included to mean above all politicians in the CDU and CSU. The cause for this shift was provided by a series of serious incidents along the border between the FRG and the GDR (end of July, early August) and the reactions of the FRG.

The "underlying cause" of the "anti-GDR campaign" is said to be the growing strength of reactionary forces in the FRG as well as the "retreat of realistically thinking forces in the Lower House parties in the face of rising pressure from revanchist forces" (94). The striking thing here is that representatives of the government coalition are implicitly also included among the enemies of detente (95).

The thought is obvious that the campaign thus launched is aimed at eliminating the troublesome point of "realistically thinking forces" in the enemy image--something which certainly would be very helpful in view of the political-ideological education of NVA soldiers.

At this moment however there are no indications as to an attempt to bring about a change in the course of detente policy (96). It remains to be

seen whether and how the variant of the growing strength of the "revanchist forces" will be further used after the rather allergic reactions to the events along the border zone--something which certainly will depend decisively on the concept of Soviet foreign policy.

6. Results

Richard Loewenthal's remark to the effect that it is impossible for the Soviet leadership "in the course of a general foreign-policy streamlining effort to give up that enemy image of imperialism which it considers indispensable for the ideological cohesion of its own country and its own empire," can similarly be applied to the SED leadership (97).

The GDR does not seem to be prepared to discard the enemy image which has its effect in its present form, whereby it would accept the contradiction resulting from that with respect to the foreign policy it pursued. For the period from 1966 to the start of 1976, one can show, in my opinion, that the emphasis in the enemy image imparted was guided by foreign policy activities. From 1966 until 1969, it was mainly the erosion of the East Bloc and the isolation of the GDR which were perceived as acts of aggression. Starting in 1969, aggression from social democratism was emphasized more heavily and as of 1973 the emphasis seems to be more on the multinational sector, that is, on NATO. The more West Germany showed itself to be ready for detente between 1966 and 1975, the more was it categorized as being aggressive and dangerous for the NVA soldiers. Eastern policy starting in 1969--as far as we can tell, did not bring about a reduction but rather caused an increase in the enemy image.

The question as to what extent the NVA soldiers are ready to accept the danger of an "imperialist war of aggression" can hardly be answered in my opinion. The source information only enables us to fall back on official publications which provide little information on that question. But there can hardly be any doubt that the objective of enemy image transmission in socialist defense education--the activation of emotionally motivated fighting qualities--is being achieved through permanent repetition from kindergarten on. The significant thing for the estimation of the enemy image's effectiveness is that socialist defense education is completely integrated into the GDR education system.

FOOTNOTES

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3. "Annex to the Order of the National Defense Council of the GDR of 10 February 1973," GBL, I, p 561.
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16. Huebner, Werner, "On Some Questions of Socialist Defense Education," *VOLKSARMEE*, Documentation, No. 11, 1965, p 23. Statements of this kind, to my knowledge, were not made from 1968 onward.
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18. Riek, Richard, "Increasing Defense Preparedness--An Objectively Necessary Step To Secure Socialist Gains," "Sozialistische Wehrerziehung in der Berufsausbildung," p 16.
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22. Ibid., p 729.
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29. "Bundeswehr Armee fuer den Krieg," Group of authors from German Institute of Military History, German Military Publishing House, Berlin, 1958, p 26.
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31. "Bundeswehr Armee fuer den Krieg," p 411f.
32. "Taschenbuch Militaerpolitik und Wehrpflicht," p 94.
33. Riek, Richard, Die Erhoehung der Verteidigungsbereitschaft," p 17. Loose, A./Glass, L., "Wehrmoral und Soldatenethos im Sozialismus," Military Publishing House of the GDR, East Berlin, 1975, pp 71-77. One important point of argumentation toward the attainment of this objective was added starting in 1972 by the Two-Nation thesis.
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
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42. Riek, Richard, "Die Erhoehung der Verteidigungsbereitschaft," p 19.
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57. "Bundeswehr Armee fuer den Krieg," p 17.
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The War Doctrine of the West German State and Its Foundations (Structural Model)



Legend: 1--analysis of political and military character of wars of aggression, "image of war"; 2--military integration; 3--in NATO; 4--international balance of power; 5--socialist defense coalition; 6--official principles for development of military affairs, "overall defense," forces planning; 7--war doctrine of West German State; 8--official military concept--"forward strategy"; 9--domestic and foreign policy program; 10--military-policy program, political and military evaluation of enemy; 11--NATO concept preached by United States; 12--status of military science and other militarily useful sciences; 13--economic and scientific-technical capacities and resources--degree of their military exploitation; 14--personnel and political-moral capabilities, degree of their military usefulness; 15--military-geographic situation and structure; 16--development level of armed forces and civilian war organization; 17--political and military-theoretical foundations; 18--basic assumptions; 19--the system of state-monopoly rule. Source: Charisius, Albrecht, "Bonn's Eastern Policy and Its War Doctrine, Part II," "Mitteilungsblatt der Arbeitsgemeinschaft ehemaliger Offiziere, No. 12, 1968, p 7.

POLAND

'POLITYKA' COMMENTS ON PYJAS DEATH

Frankfurt-Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 27 May 77

[Article by "ba": "POLITYKA Hypothetically Discusses Pyjas' Death as 'Political Murder'"]

[Text] Warsaw, 26 May--Hypothetically but explicitly, an article in the influential Polish weekly POLITYKA discusses the possibility that the case of the Krakow student Pyjas, who was found dead 2 1/2 weeks ago, might be a case of "political murder." Signed "Redaktor," the POLITYKA article deals critically with the exploitation of the death for political purposes. It argues that once this supposition is considered hypothetically, the question immediately arises as to who benefits from such a crime, and this can only be the kind of person who is interested in provoking a conflict with the state authorities.

To a certain degree, the question is left open as to what grouping might have such an interest in aggravating the situation in Poland. The detailed criticism, which follows, of attempts to exploit Pyjas' death by political street demonstrations directs the hypothetical charge "If it was murder, it was for the purpose of provocation" toward the opposition critical of the regime; but the passage concerning the question proper as to whom such a crime would benefit is not formulated with such clarity as to also make the attentive reader wonder who else might be interested in provocation and aggravation and difficulties for the Polish political leadership.

There is no attempt whatever--and that is the second remarkable thing about the POLITYKA article--of a mental confrontation with the possibility that Pyjas' death was caused by intentional politically motivated physical violence ending in unintentioned death. In that case it would no longer be possible to draw logical conclusions about the "cui bono" question, but it might be worth pondering about who, judging by past experience, might have a motive for inflicting politically motivated violence.

A third remarkable thing about the article, I think, is this: While stressing the fact that it is based only on generally known information which also has been the source of newspaper reports and commentaries, the

article places far less stress than previously (e.g., in the statement by government spokesman Janiurek) on the fact that, judging from the information which has become available so far, it is very likely that the death was an accident. Rather, emphasis is being placed on the fact that there is no exact information about the circumstances which led to Pyjas' death. Apparently the author of the article thinks it is within the realm of probability that the final result of the investigations will show that the death was not an accident (which does not necessarily mean that it was the result of a political crime). But it would perhaps be an overinterpretation to conclude from this that he has reason to assume that the police investigations are being directed toward the possibility of a crime with a personal motive because the hypothesis of an accident is shaky.

In connection with the tragic death of the student Stanislaw Pyjas, the article states in the beginning, an attempt was launched--i.e., via the Free Europe transmitter--to spread the view among Krakow students that "the state organs called on to insure security are responsible for the death." Investigations were being conducted about the "not yet clarified circumstances of Stanislaw Pyjas' death" with a view to establishing "whether anyone--and, if so, who--was responsible for this death." In such situations common sense demanded not to give any credence to private, instant versions coming from people who had not been eyewitnesses of Pyjas' dramatic moments but were only spreading guesswork.

The situation had been favorable: because of the Juvenalia student carnival and the consecration of the church in Nowa Huta, the streets had been crowded and foreign journalists had been staying in Krakow. There was too much precision in the scenario of the Krakow events to make one believe in a spontaneous reaction to Pyjas' death.

The article then states: "Here are some further premises for an understanding of the situation. For a long time now, there have been no political murders in Poland. But let us assume for a moment that Pyjas suffered a premeditated violent death and that the motive was political. The first, classic question both the politician and the lawyer will ask in such a situation is 'Cui bono?' Who could benefit from such a crime? Probably only someone who wants to direct human emotions against the state authorities. Crime is no political instrument in Poland, from any direction, but if it were so, Pyjas could be killed only by someone provoking a conflict with the people's power, regardless of what circles he came from."

The article goes on: "If an attempt is made to exploit the tragic death of a person for political street demonstrations by hurling accusations at organs of the state power which are not based on proof, those who do so are aiming at the existing climate of political coexistence, are consciously bent on provoking an aggravation of it."

Aware of the fact that a change of system was not in its power, a circle of oppositionists intended to create the impression, with tactical machinations manufactured for consumption abroad, that Poland was not in a stable state but torn by conflicts. This could lead to "aggravating internal relations" in Poland itself. But this was not in the interest of any social groupings, of any real forces in Poland; it could only be in the very limited interest of a group of people who were dreaming of some kind of internal test of strength and, during it, wanted to benefit from possible conflicts.

Since the beginning of 1971, POLITYKA states further, it had been the policy of the Polish leadership to confront little oppositionist groups politically and to limit legal steps to gross cases. This corresponded to the pertinent analysis of the fact that there was no social base in Poland which could support a political opponent. Aim and effort were directed toward democracy through consultation; street demonstrations were but an obstacle and a danger to this process of democratization.

Poland and socialism, meanwhile, constituted an obvious whole. Those who were turning the case of Pyjas into a test of strength were generally opposing the relations governing in Poland. In the present situation, the opponents of international coexistence needed such a little group, and this was the primary decisive reason why the antisocialist activity of such small groupings in Poland had met with an international response. But why did the opponents in the West need such a group?

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POLAND

FRG PAPER DISCUSSES OPPOSITION MOVEMENT IN POLAND

Angela Nacken Article

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 28 May 77

[Article by Angela Nacken: "Each Act of Resistance Saves a Piece of Freedom. They No Longer Dream of Romantic Insurrections. Poland's Rebellious Youth and Its Goal"]

[Text] When the Young Socialists [FRG Young Social Democrats] sent out invitations for a demonstration of solidarity with the Czechoslovak "Charter 77" in Frankfurt in April, his name was on the guest list. Michnik? Adam Michnik? Wasn't he one of the students who was attacked by the Polish press, after the unrest in March 1968, as one of the leaders and organizers of the student demonstrations? Nine years have passed since. The 21-year-old student at the Department of History had been sentenced as one of the "ringleaders" at the student meetings at that time and during the boycotts of lectures in 1969. The year after, party leader Gomulka fell. Gierek came to power, and the students were released from prison. A new era was to begin in Poland once again. Yet, 7 years later thousands of students are again marching silently through Krakow, putting up candles, wearing black armbands in protest against the death of one of their fellow students, the oppositionist student Stanislaw Pyjas, who died mysteriously falling down the stairs at night.

In March 1968, Gierek, then party secretary in Katowice, had noted "with great satisfaction" at a mass demonstration in his county seat that the "Michniks and their ilk" were but a comparatively small group of instigators of unrest and political adventurers, who had made careful preparations for the disgraceful excesses by exploiting the gullibility and insecurity of people.

Now--2 weeks ago--Adam Michnik has been arrested again.

If you lived in Warsaw in 1968 and look across the border today, you find yourself quite often in the position of someone attending a continuous-showing movie theater who, when certain things come on the screen again,

remembers that he had come into the theater at that point. Again, according to official statements, "a small group of ideological and political opponents" is trying to make political capital of human misery, but the planned provocation has failed.

But although appearances are similar, and the spokesmen personify the continuity of the resistance, the contents have changed. It appears that each new generation of students in Poland has its own reasons for taking to the street to protest--in 1956, 1968 and 1977. In 30 years of rule, the communists have not succeeded in convincing the young generation which was born into the People's Republic and educated in socialism of the achievements of the system. The germ of revolt, the yearning for individual freedom of this people seems ineradicable, having been passed on from one generation to the next. The demonstrators of 1968 were children of the partisans who had left the woods after the war had ended; the parents of those studying in 1977 had experienced the "Polish October" mass protest movement.

After the 20th CPSU Congress the students had become increasingly dissatisfied. In 1955 Adam Wazyk's "Poem for Adults" appeared and was discussed passionately among the students. In it, the former captain of the communist underground army campaigns against the "official lie," against a "language reduced to 30 slogans." Antoni Slonimsky, nonparty poet, scores the "imposed opinion." After years of transformation of reality into Kremlin mythology, the "Young Pioneers" of yesterday lose their illusions, recognize the hollowness of the "positive hero" of film and literature, the stolidity of socialist realism in art, and can no longer be convinced of the need of a class struggle against the bourgeoisie. With increasing openness, they abjure lipservice. The communist student league does not interfere. The leadership devolves increasingly on the people in charge of the student journal PO PROSTU. The weekly organizes debating clubs, criticizes Stalinist phenomena in academic life and in politics, publishes reports about deficiencies in the economy and inhuman bureaucracy, demands freedom of discussion and democratization of public life. Within a year, by November 1956, circulation increases from 30,000 to 150,000. At the parliamentary elections, the 28-year-old chief editor, Eligiusz Lasota, received almost as many votes as the new party chief, Gomulka.

Grandchildren of the Revolution

The journal, whose name to this day is familiar to any student in Poland, was the organ of the young intelligentsia, represented by the philosophy professor Leszek Kolakowski. They were called the madmen by their opponents. They were considered extreme leftwing, and occasionally also rightwing. Gomulka publicly condemned their proposals for "integral democracy," and in 1957 PO PROSTU was banned because of revisionism, an antiparty attitude, pessimism and defeatism. For 4 days the streets of Warsaw were pervaded by an atmosphere of rebellion. Police forcibly broke up student demonstrations. The entire editorial staff of PO PROSTU was expelled from the party.

The militant students of October 1956 were not anticomunist. The subjects of their discussions were not ideological controversies but a reckoning with the past and the officials of the Stalinist era, falsification of the history of the relations between Poland and the Soviet Union, the search for a "Polish way" to socialism, defense against overwhelming Soviet influence, becoming conscious again of national traditions in culture and science. But Gomulka did not fulfill the hopes of his cofighters and supporters. The period of upsurge was followed by a sobering period, called "small stabilization" in Poland. The auditoriums of the universities were frequented by young "realists," who adjusted, joined the newly created student league, were unwilling to jeopardize their university grants and were preparing for their professions.

In those years of external calm, the political discussion shifted to student debating societies. Already in 1955 the "Crooked Circle" had been founded for the purpose (as stated in a memorandum to the party authorities) of preventing the development of an "intellectual underground" and countering the growing influence of the Catholic Church among the young intelligentsia. Professors of Warsaw University supported the activities of this legal society. It did not take long for the party to suspect that this "Hyde Park" was a dangerous center for opposition of any stripe. Particularly two young assistants at the Department of History of Warsaw University, who had been students at the time of the "Polish October," in the beginning of the sixties were making no secret of their oppositionist views. They were Jacek Kuron and Karol Modzelewski. Fifteen years later, they were still occupying the attention of the security authorities. Kuron now is a spokesman of the "Committee for the Defense of the Workers" and was arrested following the Krakow demonstrations.

At one time Kuron was a member of the Presidium of the Socialist Youth League at Warsaw University and director of the debating society founded by that league. Modzelewski is the son of postwar Poland's second foreign minister. Their names are just as unknown in the West as is their analysis, written from the Marxist point of view, of the "monopoly socialism" of the ruling system of Eastern Europe. This 128-page work, meant originally as a dissertation, is the most radical critique of social reality in ruling socialism that has ever been written by Marxists. In place of the monopoly bureaucratic order, the authors have in mind a workers' democracy in which the workers govern through their councils and several parties and which has no censorship, political police, professional army or exploitation by "state capital." More interesting than the program, with its idealistic-utopian features, is the diagnosis of the deep crisis of the system.

A new student generation wanted the floor. The increasing stagnation in the beginning of the sixties had robbed them of the belief in possible reforms, for which the "October revolutionaries" had fought in vain. In post-Stalinist times, criticism is directed no longer at individual phenomena of the regime but at the foundations. In 1956, Adam Wazyk had still proclaimed, "We demand, we call, we are calling daily for help by

the party"; experience had taught the people who were growing up that no answer was to be expected from that quarter. Frustration produced aggression. When Kuron and Modzelewski were arrested in March 1965 and sentenced to prison terms of 3 and 3 1/2 years, respectively, for "producing and spreading materials harmful to the interests of the Polish state," a group of students sang the internationale in court.

Truncheons and Tear Gas

The oppositionist movement among the students had its martyrs. An "Open Letter to the Polish United Workers Party" circulated secretly among them, a letter put out by Kuron and Modzelewski after their first arrest and expulsion from the party and university students league to inform the members about their theses. Although most of the students did not agree with the program, the document had the taste of forbidden fruit, of conspiratorial, independent thinking--against the hierarchy of the establishment. The revolution had graduated its children long before; now it was encountering its grandchildren. The leading officials, the Stalinists of day before yesterday--the revisionists of yesterday, the realists of today--have their particular father-son problems.

A group of students of the Warsaw "elite" schools who after the closure of the "Crooked Circle" in 1962 applied for admission at party offices called themselves the "Society of Contradiction Seekers." Members included children of high state and party officials who had already noticed the discrepancy between word and deed, between theory and practice, in the parental home, who found the official history of the Communist Party to have been corrected in the family chronicle, who had been able to gather their own impressions in early trips to the West. This "banana youth"--as it was to be derided later after the student unrest--was trying to quench its thirst of knowledge about the world and its political contexts without regard to the ruling censorship, seeking political activity outside the boring events organized by the mass organizations. Among the most active people of this group was high school student Adam Michnik.

When Kuron and Modzelewski were released early from their imprisonment in 1967, the quiet on the surface was concealing the growing economic mal-content of the workers, who were remaining silent, the embitterment of intellectuals and authors, the struggle for power in the party leadership and the explosive atmosphere among the students, who did not see any prospect for the future and most of whom had fallen prey to apathy.

The cancellation of performances of Mickiewicz' "Funeral Rites" at the National Theater, where the audience had strongly applauded the national author's anti-Russian "passages," provided the spark. Shouting "Independence without censorship," students protested the action at the last performance, more than 3,000 signatures were collected for a petition against the measure by the party leadership--now having become shaky--and after the demonstrations in the theater Michnik and another student were

expelled from the university. Protesting this action, students assemble in the courtyard of the university on 8 March 1968, student Lasota reads out a petition, "representatives of the working class" transported to the university in buses are pelted with rocks and workers militia and police go into action with truncheons and tear gas. The unrest expands to other universities. Kuron, Modzelewski and Michnik are arrested and, as the main instigators of the student demonstrations, sentenced to up to 3 years' imprisonment. The slogan on the banners of the striking students of the Polytechnic had read "Warsaw is with us," but the population remained on the sidelines. Workers do not take to the street for the abolition of censorship. Only 2 years later, when food prices had been raised drastically, would they try insurrection.

The New Opposition Insists on Its Rights

By calling for abolition of censorship and accurate information, the students had turned against the party once again, but in doing so they symbolically carried the constitution in their hands. Even then, long before the Helsinki decisions, did they announce a demand which has now become a movement in all of Eastern Europe--observance of civic rights in accordance with Articles 71, 72 and 74 of the constitution and abolition of penalties not contained in the penal code, such as dismissal from employment and refusal of a passport. For the first time a trend became apparent of a new opposition which agreed to follow the tactic of holding the people in power to the laws and declarations issued or signed by them, of insisting on the legality of their actions. They did not succeed.

After the change in the top party leadership, things were comparatively quiet at the universities in the beginning of the seventies, with disciplinary measures against the "instigators of unrest" and new regulations about university grants intended to teach the students discipline. But soon the increased ideological-political education--taken into the bargain as an obligatory exercise--was deprived of its fruits, which were doubtful in any case: the forcible repressive measures against the striking workers of Ursus and Radom in 1976 have a much stronger emotional effect on the students than did the events of 1968. Intellectuals having founded the "Committee for the Workers," students maintain contact between the committee and the families.

They have, however, learned from the defeats of the past generations of 1956 and 1968. A new self-confidence is apparent as one of them says, "We do not let ourselves be pressured any longer, we do not let ourselves be driven up the wall." They no longer dream of romantic insurrections. With extreme discipline, their funeral march proceeded through Krakow in May under the watchful eyes of the security police. They do not want to be told again, as in 1968, that teenage rowdies, human scum, have disturbed peace and order, giving the police an excuse for using force. Nor did the arrest of Michnik and Kuron after the Krakow demonstrations lead to spontaneous actions. The party has been warned: it cannot be

under any illusions about the built-up tension in the country in light of the poor supply situation, of an explosive mood among the intellectuals and of the voice, issuing increasingly loud warnings, of the spiritual leader of the nation, Cardinal Wyszynski.

The Struggle of the Church

The third-generation opposition no longer protests censorship. Rather, it tries to substitute constant social pressure for the lacking public opinion. "Each act of resistance saves a piece of freedom and preserves those values without which a nation cannot survive," wrote Michnik in a series of articles about the Polish opposition which he published in a German newspaper at the end of a 9-month stay in the West. What distinguishes today's opposition from previous movements, he wrote, is the conviction that a program of evolution must be addressed to an independent public opinion and not merely to the totalitarian authorities; instead of telling the government what improvements it should make, the program has to tell society how to act.

Michnik also knows that this program, characterized by him as "new evolutionism," can be realized only if the workers see to it that the kind of pressure is exercised which alone--as was shown by the unrest on the coast in 1970--can cause the party to make concessions. In these efforts, the "Committee for the Workers" is assigned a hinging function. Yet, the stanchness with which the Polish advocates of a "socialism with a human face" are publicly coming out for their clearly defined goals should not hide the view of the widespread skepticism with which the Catholic people between the Odra and the Bug regards all leftist socialists theories, of whatever stripe. A mass movement of the opposition became evident in the people's indignation about the police violence in Radom and Ursus. In the hour of anguish, the nation gathered not in auditoriums and committees but around the altar. The rebellious students also know that for decades the most effective defenders of human rights in Poland have been those standing in the pulpits. On the other hand, when the contents of the wage envelope and the Sunday joint are at stake, the workers go it alone. The party is facing 30 million people in a state of vigilance. "When something new happens now..." The Polish woman who has just arrived from Warsaw does not finish the sentence; but there is great concern in her voice.

Michnik, as well, the advocate of democratic socialism, is close to circles of the Polish Catholic intelligentsia. Soon his book entitled "Church, Left and Dialog" will appear in France, where he has been staying in the past few months at the invitation of Jean Paul Sartre. In it, the analyst, unburdened by ideological blinkers, assesses the church under Cardinal Wyszynski's leadership as the most powerful defender of freedom in the Polish People's Republic. Whether the church has defended freedom only in its own behalf or in behalf of a pluralistic society, Michnik does not say. Against the advice of his friends, he returned to his homeland.

He knew what was awaiting him there, but "fortunately there is in all of us an inherent need for revolt, an unquenchable longing for a life in dignity and truth. It is for the sake of this longing that one must fight." Words from a cell in Poland in 1977.

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Erik Michael Bader Article

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 26 May 77

[Article by Erik Michael Bader: "What Is Now Going To Happen to the Opposition in Poland? The Case of Pyjas and the Arrest of Nine Oppositionists Have Created a New Situation"]

[Text] Warsaw, May--In the future one will probably have to put up with a certain amount of opposition. This is about the way a high Polish party official put it some months ago. Has the attitude prevailed in the meantime that one must make an all-out effort to put an end to the opposition? The chances are that the turn of events in Poland is not that extreme. Apparently people figure that the arrest of nine particularly active members of the opposition might suffice at least to stop a further growth of organized opposition. In the case of an opposition movement which has reached as yet a comparatively small degree of organizational consolidation and ramification, a temporary stop may quickly cause erosion. On the other hand, the arrest of some members and collaborators of the Committee for the Defense of the Workers has also caused it to become better known, and this has the opposite effect. Thus it appears impossible to predict at this time what the future holds--whether the opposition movement in Poland has passed its peak or, on the contrary, in a phase of tougher confrontation, will only now really start to unfold.

Poland has a comparatively liberal regime, and there is widespread fear lest in the case of too much unrest Big Brother quickly put an end to this degree of liberality--a fear which is being used to keep things under control. While an opposition movement enjoys a certain amount of freedom of movement in this situation, it also at the same time faces considerable difficulties in gaining wider support. What is required under these conditions is the development of an opposition movement which is not merely latent but active, as well as concrete negative provocations. After the first beginnings--caused by the amendment of the constitution, which had aroused opposition--such provocations were provided in the form of punitive measures against the participants in the June protests, and these triggered the founding of the Committee for the Defense of the Workers. All that the people affected had done was to vent widespread displeasure more clearly and actively than the rest. The original activity of the committee--organization of social aid for those affected and their families

and issuing of information about the extent of persecution--was disrupted and publicly scorned but was tolerated to a considerable extent (perhaps also because it was of a professedly temporary nature).

It appears that, at least in the eyes of part of the committee, this ostensibly fairly unpolitical, rather humanitarian and informational, activity from the start was probably meant to be rather a vehicle for organizing an opposition movement intended to outlast the concrete cause of its birth. Recently it became more apparent that it had been planned to turn the committee and its supporters--predominantly in university circles--into a permanent institution receiving and publicizing complaints, exercising a permanent watch and control function and taking care of its collaborators.

It appears, however, that this transition to an institution which regarded itself no longer as a citizens' initiative but as a political opposition had not been fully completed. The mysterious death of the Krakow student Pyjas taken up by the committee occurred at a moment when, as a result of the release from custody of the people who had been condemned after the June protests and large-scale reemployment of the people who had been given notice, the original reason for the establishment of the committee had largely disappeared. The opposition movement needed a new striking case of complaint, but it had not yet developed sufficiently to be able to withstand fairly strong countermeasures by the regime without suffering substantial harm. The case of Pyjas provided both--a new topic and greater confrontation--and, at the same time, was opportune and inopportune.

If it had not taken up the case of Pyjas, the committee would have run the risk of losing credibility in its desired role of a permanent social watch organ. To say so does not mean to agree with the charge made by the authorities that committee members with cynical premeditation had exploited an unfortunate incident for purposes of political agitation. It is possible for the motive of conviction to coincide with a tactical requirement--and there was also, after all, the other, diametrically opposite, tactical requirement of avoiding greater confrontation at this stage. It is entirely feasible that the security organs were almost waiting for the committee to become exposed in order that they might get the opportunity of proceeding against the committee and its consolidation. While giving the case wider publicity--also abroad--the committee at the same time almost appears to have rendered the authorities a service by apparently exercising a moderating influence on the Krakow students and counteracting an unrestrained outbreak in Krakow; this leads one to suspect that the activity of the arrested committee members in connection with the case of Pyjas was an excuse for their arrest rather than the real reason.

The case of Pyjas appeared to be so serious that it could not help but force the committee to make a move, and the authorities to make some kind of countermove. At the moment it appears that the results are more to the

advantage of the authorities. Apparently they have put the core of the committee out of action--not through open action, however, but by reacting to an attack. Over the longer term, this may turn out to have been a doubtful gain. The longer the people are under arrest, the greater will be the need to justify the arrest by a trial and conviction in order to avoid the impression that the arrests were purely a measure of political suppression. This sort of thing causes a disagreeable echo, however. Yet by that time the Belgrade conference may be over. It is difficult to imagine that domestically the case of a few oppositionist intellectuals charged with spreading an accusation of murder (which, right or wrong, they are unlikely ever to be able to prove for certain) would then arouse the same degree of solidarity as was aroused by the case of hundreds of workers who had been subjected to punitive measures after the June protests. Another mysterious death in Poland could change the situation considerably, however.

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POLAND

MBFR 'ASYMMETRIC' REDUCTION CONCEPT DECRIED

'TRYBUNA LUDU' Summarizes 'PRAVDA' Editorial

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 11-12 Jun 77 p 2 AU

[Text] PAP, Moscow--It is worth noting that PRAVDA, organ of the CPSU Central Committee, took to task on 8 June the Western concept of "asymmetric" reductions in troops. This concept stipulates that the Warsaw Pact armed forces should be reduced in two stages by 240,000-250,000 troops altogether and the NATO armed forces by only 80,000-90,000 troops. PRAVDA drew attention to the fact that the West demands that in the first stage the USSR should withdraw a tank army of 68,000 soldiers and the United States would at the same time withdraw from various units only 29,000 troops, who would leave their arms in Europe.

As a matter of fact, however, the numerical data which the participants in the Vienna negotiations exchanged last year does not justify this asymmetry. This data shows that NATO possesses 981,000 ground and air troops in central Europe whereas the Warsaw Pact states possess 987,300. The numerical strength of the ground forces is also close: 971,000 for NATO and 805,000 for the Warsaw Pact states. PRAVDA stresses that this data demonstrates an approximate balance of forces, which justifies equal reductions in the troops and armaments on both sides.

Polish Delegate Comments on Western MBFR Proposals

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 11-12 Jun 77 p 2 AU

[Tadeusz Derlatka Vienna dispatch: "Vienna Negotiations--Reductions Must Be Based on Just Principles"]

[Text] The 19 states participating in the negotiations on the mutual reductions in armed forces and armaments in central Europe held another session in the Vienna Hofburg under the chairmanship of FRG Ambassador Wolfgang Behrens. G. Cox of Canada spoke on behalf of the Western delegations.

He repeated once again the NATO states' demand that the socialist countries should reduce more troops than the Western countries. He tried to justify this demand by the so-called geographical factor, that is, by the Soviet Union's immediate proximity to the reduction zone.

On behalf of the socialist delegations the spokesman of the Polish delegation pointed out in his talk with newsmen that, in keeping with the official data presented by the two sides, there exists a genuine equilibrium of forces. Insofar as the so-called geographical factor is concerned, it had been taken into consideration during the initial talks when joint negotiating principles were being formulated. In view of this, expanding the scope of the Vienna negotiations would not in any way be justified and would not favor progress in the talks. The Western delegations, the Polish spokesman said, have introduced the so-called geographical factor into the discussion only to achieve unilateral military advantages. The socialist countries still want the future reduction accord to be concluded on the basis of just foundations and the reduction to be equal on both sides.

CSO: 2600

POLAND

PZPR DAILY LASHES OUT AT RFE, OTHER FRG MEDIA

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 6 Jun 77 p 7 AU

[Article by Michael Misiorny: "Radio Centers of Propaganda and Subversion--Organized Lies"]

[Text] To better characterize the state and the development of Polish-FRG relations, one of the outstanding Bonn Social Democratic politicians, H. Wehner, used this metaphor: "They are like a house with a roof, but still unfinished, one that still requires much work, although what has already been built deserves a positive appraisal, because, after all, the house has been erected, and this is what matters."

That a prominent member of the leading echelon of a party which, in a coalition with the FDP, is in power in the FRG uses such a metaphor seems to show that the Bonn Government wants to successfully complete the "construction of the house" and that this intention suggests good will on its part. No one questions this, but at times one is assailed by doubts in connection with certain features.

"How is it," Comrade R. N. from Swiebodzin asks, "that on the one hand we have statements purporting to show the utmost willingness to cooperate and on the other hand," (TRYBUNA LUDU writes about this) "we have a veritable anti-Polish campaign waged by the FRG press and radio?"

This Doubt Is Crucial Indeed and Indeed Not Isolated, Cooperating With Bankrupts

The anti-Polish campaign that is being waged by the FRG mass media--the press, radio and television--bears quite prominent marks of ill will and of badly concealed practical political pinpricks. The anticommunist campaign whose element is propaganda directed against People's Poland is increasing in proportion to the intensity of the domestic problems in the leading capitalist countries. This campaign helps at least partially to divert the attention of the public in these countries from the crucial and burning social and political problems of the present times and helps sow the illusion that the situation is worse in other countries, that is, in the socialist countries. This black

and gray propaganda presents People's Poland in a way that suggests that we are on the threshold of an economic disaster and that our people consist of only Michniks, Kurons, Blumsztajns and Blajfers and that all our people are incarcerated.

There is no room in this article to straighten the paths of hostile propaganda, to polemize and to plead that reality should be faced. What is at stake is the question which that troubled reader asks: "How is it really? Do you really want to complete the construction of that house in cooperation with bankrupts?"

FRG politicians often reply to this by helplessly shrugging their shoulders: What do you want? Our press is independent. Our newsmen enjoy the guaranteed freedom of exercising their professions and the government has no influence on the editorial policy of individual media. This is why the government does not thing and the press does another...

It goes without saying that in the FRG and in other countries the so-called independent press is dependent to a much greater degree on vested interests than on the government or the governing parties; it is dependent on the true wielders of power--the owners of production means, who have the press at their call or who own it. But do they own all the press and have it all at their call? After all, there exist and function in the FRG (and in Great Britain, France and the United States) propaganda and information institutions, run by the government or its agencies, which profess basically the same propaganda-information policy as the editorial policy of the so-called independent newspapers.

Whose Radio Stations?

The so-called radio law passed by the FRG Bundestag in November 1960 established two propaganda stations beamed to foreign countries--Deutschlandfunk and Deutsche Welle. The Deutschlandfunk station was set up earlier, in 1952, within the ARD [Working Association of the FRG Statutory Broadcasting Corporations] and has been a subversive propaganda station from the very beginning. The Bundestag law introduced a certain structural order and defined the status of the stations in question (DW and DLF are public institutions in keeping with the Bundesgesetzblatt 1960, part one, page 862). These stations began their regular programs, beamed at first to the Third World, in 1962, and as of 1 January 1964 they began beaming programs to the socialist countries. Their original main addressee was the GDR and later on the USSR. Following the CSCE in Helsinki, the activities of the two stations have been extended even further (a new "impulse"), and as of 1 January of this year, the Deutschlandfunk has taken over the main propaganda tasks vis-a-vis Poland because the Deutsche Welle concentrates its attention on programs to the USSR. As for the DW and the DLF, the representatives of the [FRG] government cannot helplessly shrug their shoulders and talk about their inability to influence independent newsmen. These stations are their stations; may we assume that these stations implement these representatives' propaganda policy?

The position of RFE is similar. On the initiative of the U.S. Government and intelligence service, the National Committee for Free Europe was set up in May 1949, and radio was made its main tool of propaganda and subversive activities. The committee was apparently a private association (Free Europe Incorporated), which was convenient to the extent that the U.S. Government did not need to identify itself with RFE, and the U.S. intelligence service was able to use it as a recruitment (yes!) base and as a tool of subversive and propaganda activities. All this did not relieve the U.S. Government of the obligation to finance this project (\$45 million for RFE and Radio Liberty in 1973 during Nixon's presidency and over \$60 now). Up to 1961 New York was the Committee's headquarters, and only individual departments were housed in Munich, but now Munich is headquarters of RFE and Radio Liberty, which has created an additional problem of the presence of U.S. subversive and propaganda centers in the allegedly free FRG.

In view of the above, is it worth examining separately the structure and origins of the BBC, Radio Paris and so on?

I do not think it is. What is crucial is the assertion that these state or clandestinely state institutions (as in the case of RFE and Radio Liberty) implement propaganda and subversive policy stimulated by the tactics and strategy of the Western anticommunist crusade--policy that in principle is not different from the political line adopted by the Springer Press or by the so-called serious dailies such as LE MONDE or FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG. The differences between the individual media are merely quantitative. If the BBC is more moderate, the RFE, Deutschlandfunk (judging by its Polish programs), the Springer DIE WELT or the archconservative, and therefore absolutely blind, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG are all the more rabid and all the more mendacious.

Antisocialist and Anti-Polish

RFE's anti-Polish campaign is now assuming grotesque features: its influence is no longer directed at serious and critically thinking people, but at people who are thoughtless, easily emotional and susceptible to suggestion. Let me use a paradox: if we are to believe RFE, the author of this article quite frequently indulges in antistate activities. From Leszek Kolakowski's statement (on 23 March) I learned that in a totalitarian state such as Poland "every activity which is not a state-controlled activity becomes a political activity regardless of the intentions of those who engage in it."

But do I act in an anti-totalitarian manner when, for example, I read a boring, but French, novel by Butor? Of course not, because this novel has been published in Poland by a totalitarian state publishing agency. Not until I ponder, having read the book, upon Butor and the patina deposited on the so-called new novel do I act in an antistate manner because the state, which supports Butor, wants me to accept him and delight in him. "This is because the state would like to nationalize not only the means of production, but also the people and their thoughts and all media," RFE explained through Kolakowski.

This paradox is also proof--this does not disturb us--that the thesis about the totalitarian state that totally manipulates man is really the main theoretical foundation of RFE programs. Unfortunately, precisely this thesis beamed to a country of such traditional freedoms as Poland condemns RFE programs to failure insofar as thinking listeners are concerned. But what can you do when this thesis is needed? Is it necessary to prove that the people who rallied in the so-called kor [small-print abbreviation of the workers defense committee] deserve support precisely because they oppose the totalitarianism of the state?

Falsified Picture

The selected appellations ascribed by the Western state subversive radio stations to Michnik and Kuronn are "Polish democratic activist", "educator," "historian" and "intellectual". No one in the country (or in the West) knows of any historical work by Michnik or of any educational work by Kuro, but everyone knows that, to save democracy, these two "Polish democratic activists" organized base provocations in connection with the death of an unfortunate youth and did not hesitate to broadcast to the world that this death was a political murder and thus to discredit our country in the eyes of the world. Who wanted to profit by this death? Who needed it? We know who: it is enough to switch on a radio set and to tune it in to the subversive stations and their programs.

RFE and the Deutschlandfunk have now become something of court chroniclers in the service of a group of adversaries of socialism in People's Poland. Information repeated 10 or 15 times, skillful maneuvers with quotations (to create the impression that the radio station merely quotes what others say and write), a veritable Western featuring persecution, arrests, torture and murders--this is briefly the picture of present-day Poland presented by RFE and some Deutschlandfunk programs.

The activity of many state propaganda centers in the West with regard to Poland is contrary to the spirit of CSCE. This activity receives in Poland the reception it deserves because, contrary to what the editors of the aforementioned media assume, there are not that many uncritical listeners in our country.

CSO: 2600

POLAND

GIEREK OPENS PZPR PLENUM ON HOUSING CONSTRUCTION

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 8 Jun 77 p 1 AU

[Report on opening speech by Edward Gierek, first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee, at the 7 June Central Committee plenum on housing construction]

[Text] Opening the plenum, E. Gierek said that the issues to be discussed were of great, nationwide importance. The task of meeting housing needs with increasing effectiveness, he said, is an important part of the social policy adopted by the sixth and developed by the seventh congresses. At the Fifth Plenum 5 years ago the Central Committee worked out and adopted a long-term housing program. The sessions of the Politburo and the Central Committee Secretariat consistently evaluate and analyze these issues, and the government and its agencies pay utmost attention to them. In addition, the party voivodship committees, local state authorities, self-management bodies and cooperatives do their best to exploit the possibilities for promoting housing construction. This is very important because today housing is becoming one of primary issues of the strategy of Poland's socioeconomic development and a crucial element of improving our people's conditions. This is why we expect that this plenum will analyze the possibilities and potentials for speeding up our housing program with the help of our great housing achievements and the great practical knowledge of party organizations and bodies, state bodies, social organizations and the individual professional communities. Gierek stressed that the Eighth Plenum Session had been preceded by comprehensive analytical work carried out by many specialist teams and by creative discussions among PZPR party aktiws, allied party aktiws and economic aktiws. He also recalled that a party-government team had been appointed by the Fourth Plenum in 1976 to work out measures to insure the implementation of the housing program. The measures and ideas resulting from this extensive work and from discussions illustrate the great efforts by the party and the state to insure increasingly better housing conditions for our people. They have also laid bare the problems that must be tackled if we want to fully solve the housing issue in our country. As you see, the Central Committee possesses a very thorough and comprehensive knowledge of the state of housing and its needs. This is a good basis for constructive discussion and for further measures to solve this national problem.

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